a market, the price must be zero. This is no longer true when government is present and taxes are distortionary. Conditions may arise in which optimal policy creates intentional waste through the hoarding or stockpiling of output even while production is carried out e¢ ciently. In the absence of optimal lump sum transfers, this may be a second best method for getting income into the hands of some agents, particularly those who are favored by the government. Section 5 provides an example with optimal excess supply. One may ask why the government does not simply give away the surplus. The answer is that a giveaway would lower the price for the good in question, thus hurting some in ‡uential agents (farmers, in the case of agricultural stockpiles). Also, a giveaway may have unwanted general equilibrium repercussions via income e¤ects.
The government's purchases of surplus may seem rather Keynesian in nature since they have no direct e¤ect on the utility of any household. But recall that the optimal tax policy leads to production e¢ ciency, with or without excess supply. Hence the purchases are not
Keynesian in the traditional sense -they are not undertaken to correct an ine¢ ciency. Instead they are motivated by distributional objectives.
Background
This section presents in general terms the gap in the literature's proofs of the production e¢ ciency theorem for economies with pro…ts. Appendix A provides the …ne detail. The proof of the production e¢ ciency theorem uses the contrapositive: given any initial tax equilibrium that is productively ine¢ cient, we can …nd a new tax equilibrium that is welfare-superior to the initial one. Thus production ine¢ ciency cannot be optimal.
The problems in the literature can be illustrated, at least in general terms, with diagrams. The two dimensions of the page cannot tell the whole story, but the basic idea should follow.
Consider an initial productively ine¢ cient equilibrium A illustrated in …gure 1. The curve in the …rst panel is …rm 1's production e¢ ciency frontier. This …rm is producing at point A1 on its frontier, generating positive pro…ts; similarly for …rm 2 in the second panel. The economy as a whole is represented in the third panel. The aggregate production frontier is labeled "aggregate." The consumer's o¤er curve is also shown. By adjusting tax rates, and hence consumer prices, the government can move the consumer anywhere along the o¤er curve.
In this particular equilibrium, the third panel shows aggregate production and consumption at point A which is the sum of A1 and A2. Production and consumption are required to coincide since previous proofs have not permitted excess supply. (Though see footnote 7.) While each …rm individually is operating on its e¢ ciency frontier, aggregate production is ine¢ cient since …rm 1's marginal product exceeds …rm 2's.
The proof now identi…es a new equilibrium B that is welfare-superior to A. This new equilibrium may be found by slightly reducing a tax rate from where it was in A. If consumers dislike this tax (and we should always be able to …nd a tax they do not like) welfare rises. The small tax change induces a small movement along the o¤er curve to point B in the third panel of …gure 2. Since point A was in the interior of the aggregate production possibilities set, and since B is very close to A, B will be productively feasible -it will lie on or below the aggregate frontier. Since B is productively feasible it must be possible to divide up production between the two …rms with the sum equal to B. Furthermore, since B is very close to A, the allocation of production across …rms can be done so that each …rm's production is very close to where it was in the initial equilibrium. Now here is where the argument runs into di¢ culty: since production for each …rm has not moved very far, neither have pro…ts. And any slight change in pro…ts can be o¤set with a slight change in the tax rates on pro…ts to leave net dividends una¤ected. But this may not be the case. Instead, it may be that the only way to allocate the aggregate production point B across …rms is as illustrated in the …rst two panels of …gure 2. Firm 1's production point has moved only slightly from A1 to B1, and similarly for …rm 2. Nonetheless, pro…ts have moved discretely from positive to zero.
The …rms'new production points lie below their frontiers so they cannot be maximizers with positive pro…ts. 4 This discrete change in pro…ts causes a discrete change in the consumer's and is still labeled with As. New aggregate production and consumption are to be at B in the third panel. In order for production by the individual …rms to sum to B, …rm 1 produces at B1 in the …rst panel and …rm 2 produces at B2 in the second panel. (The …rm with the large marginal product expands and the …rm with the small marginal product contracts.) dividend income which cannot be o¤set with changes in the tax rates on pro…ts. The result is then a shift in the o¤er curve (not illustrated) which is not accounted for by the proof in the literature. When the o¤er curve shifts, aggregate demand moves with it and demand no longer equals supply -the economy is no longer in equilibrium. There lies the problem.
This problem appears in corollary 3 of Hahn (1973) . We can relate Hahn's construction to …gure 2 above. In …gure 2 we worked in reverse: we took an aggregate consumption point (B) and then found the possible production vectors for each of the …rms (B1 and B2) such that aggregate production equals aggregate consumption. We then discussed the …rms' pro…ts at these production vectors. Hahn formalizes this with the point-to-set mapping (x) where x is an aggregate consumption vector, and (x) gives the attainable pro…ts for all private …rms. Hahn's analysis includes public production while the …gures here do not; this does not alter the thrust of the argument -we could re-interpret …rm 2 in the …gures as publicly owned. The proof of Hahn's corollary 3 claims that (x) is lower semi-continuous at the optimum that solves the government's problem. I.e., starting from the optimum, if aggregate consumption is altered slightly then it is possible that pro…ts also change only slightly. But as …gure 2 indicates, this is not necessarily true: starting from any initial …rms'frontiers that add up to B. So we can maintain positive pro…ts. However, in the more relevant case with many …rms and many commodities this does not generalize. equilibrium, a small change in aggregate consumption in the third panel may force a private …rm o¤ its production frontier in one of the preceding panels thus causing a discrete change in pro…ts. Mirrlees (1972) presents an example on page 107 in which production is ine¢ cient at the optimum. Section 4 below will discuss this example further, but for now we note its relationship to …gure 2. Unlike the …gure here, the Mirrlees example has a …rm with a kink in its production frontier. If we had such a …rm in …gure 2, it would be especially di¢ cult to maintain positive pro…ts after a shift from A to B: not only would we face the challenge of trying to keep this …rm on its e¢ ciency frontier, we would face the further challenge of trying to keep its production on the particular side of its kink where pro…ts are positive. As Mirrlees demonstrates, this is too great a challenge. Starting from the productively ine¢ cient equilibrium, we cannot …nd a new equilibrium that is welfare-superior.
Return now to the case of smooth frontiers. The way I solve the problem in …gure 2 is to allow for the possibility of excess supply. Then aggregate production can lie to the northeast of aggregate consumption. This is illustrated in …gure 3. In the third panel, aggregate consumption stays at the same welfare-superior point B as in …gure 2. Production vectors for the "true"new equilibrium are labeled with Cs. In the …rst panel, …rm 1 is now generating positive pro…ts at C1 on its e¢ ciency frontier to the northeast of B1. Since C1 is close to B1, and since B1 was close to A1, the pro…ts at C1 are close to the pro…ts at A1.
A small change in …rm 1's pro…ts tax will leave net dividends exactly as they were in the initial equilibrium A; similarly for …rm 2. Since the consumer's income from dividends has not changed, the o¤er curve remains in place, unlike the proposed construction with the Bs. In the third panel the aggregate production point is now at C, the sum of C1 and C2. This welfare-superior equilibrium as illustrated has excess supply.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides some preliminaries that are used to prove the main production e¢ ciency result in section 4. Section 5 presents an example with optimal excess supply. The idea behind the example is as follows. One of the …rms produces output in excess of consumer demand. The surplus could be eliminated if the …rm simply produced less output from the same inputs. However, it is optimal for the …rm to produce on its e¢ ciency frontier since this generates positive pro…ts which are distributed to households in a way that enhances social welfare. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. Production moves to points labeled with Cs. In the …rst panel, …rm 1 produces at C1 on its frontier to the northeast of B1. Similarly, …rm 2 produces at C2. In the third panel, C is the sum of C1 and C2. It lies to the northeast of B, on or below the aggregate frontier.
Model
The model here is quite standard. After a brief description, notation and other details follow.
Consumers are utility maximizing price takers. All consumers face the same prices. Taxes and subsidies are not modeled explicitly. Rather, they follow implicitly from the di¤erence between consumer prices and producer prices. 5 Furthermore, di¤erent producers may face di¤erent prices. This allows for taxes and subsidies on intermediate goods -e.g., when the price paid by a retailer di¤ers from the price received by a wholesaler, the di¤erence is the tax or subsidy. It also allows for …rm-speci…c tax rates on pro…ts. Firms act in the interests of their shareholders, who can see through the corporate veil. Hence …rms choose production levels to maximize after-tax pro…ts. It follows that gross of tax prices have no bearing on …rms' decisions, so in this paper any reference to producer prices will be net of all taxes. Production e¢ ciency occurs when all …rms face identical price ratios, or equivalently, when all …rms face price vectors lying on the same line. This can be implemented by setting zero taxes on intermediate goods, while still permitting …rm-speci…c tax rates on pro…ts. Thus, when the production e¢ ciency theorem applies, an optimizing government will choose not 5 It may be more appropriate to use buyer prices and seller prices rather than consumer prices and producer prices. However the use of the latter is completely standard in the literature. The two approaches are not equivalent. E.g., in a pure exchange economy there are no producer prices yet taxes may be imposed. One di¢ culty with the use of buyer prices and seller prices is the kink in consumers'budget sets. 6 to tax intermediates even if it has the ability to do so.
Households are labeled h = 1; : : : ; H. Household h has consumption set X h IR n (net of endowment), utility function U h , and lump sum income M h . All households face the same vector of prices q 0. 6 Utility maximization results in net demand functions x h (q; M h ), de…ned on the domain where the maximum -which is assumed to be unique -exists.
Aggregate net demand is x(q; M) := P h x h (q; M h ), de…ned on the domain where all of the x h s are de…ned.
Firms are labeled f = 0; : : : ; F . Firm f has convex net production set Y f IR n . The aggregate production set is Y := P f 0 Y f . Firm 0 is the production unit for the public sector. Firms f 1 are privately owned, pro…t maximizing, price takers. Producer prices are given by p f and pro…ts by f , both of which are net of producer taxes and taxes on
f to consist of all those production points that are capable of generating strictly positive pro…ts.
Speci…cally,
If we take a point in Y + f and scale its supporting price vector up or down we can achieve any level of positive pro…ts, as large or as small as we like. The process of scaling the price vector may be interpreted as an adjustment to the tax rate on pro…ts. If we adjust too far we may get a rather impractical negative tax on pro…ts, but this can always be avoided by re-normalizing the prices. The set Y + f does not necessarily coincide with the boundary of Y f . For instance, consider …rms that have constant returns to scale.
The proportion of …rm f 1 owned by household h is hf 0. Thus P h hf = 1 for each f 1. Let be the H F matrix with hf in row h and column f . The government imposes a head tax T (subsidy if negative). Therefore, 2.1 De…nition. An equilibrium is a vector (q; M; y 0 ; : : : ; y F ; p 1 ; : : : ; p F ; ; T ) that satis…es:
Note the weak inequality in (c). This permits excess supply, which will be the focus of section 5. With regard to terminology, "excess supply" here is equivalent to "non-tight" equilibria in Guesnerie (1977) . It also bears resemblance to the possibility of a government budget surplus in Berliant and Page (2001) . In order to prove the results in sections 3 and 4 below, the weak inequality turns out to be crucial. The papers cited in appendix A do not permit excess supply and this leads to problems as outlined in section 1.1. If all households exhaust all their income then the government must satisfy its budget constraint with equality. This is just Walras'Law. In symbols, q x = 1 M = P f 1 p f y f HT . An interpretation is that the government buys all output from private sector …rms at producer prices then sells x to consumers at consumer prices, with added revenue e¤ects from the head tax. Of course, this interpretation is excessively interventionist since the market can facilitate most transactions. However, the government does intervene directly to purchase the surplus,
(Technically, any part of the surplus that the public sector produces using Y 0 is not "purchased." Rather, the inputs used to produce this output are purchased.)
In this paper, excess supply refers to these residual purchases by the government.
Almost production e¢ ciency
If the production e¢ ciency result holds, it can be stated in contrapositive form: For any equilibrium in which aggregate net output satis…es y 2 int(Y ), there exists another equilibrium with higher social welfare. 8 This section proves a weaker result (corollary 3.2). The
. This result will then be used in section 4 to prove the full production e¢ ciency theorem.
Each equilibrium yields its own Y . So consider an equilibrium, denoted by bars over variables. Then Y will consist of those aggregate production points that are capable of generating the same vector of pro…ts as . To construct Y , …rst de…ne Y f for each f 1 as
preserve the sign of f , and hence by scaling p f , can preserve the value of f . Note that scaling p f is equivalent to changing the pro…ts tax rate for …rm f . By construction,
3.1 Theorem. Assume x is a continuous function of q, and V is a locally non-satiated function of q. Consider an equilibrium denoted by bars over variables. For this equilibrium, de…ne Y as above. If x( q; M) 2 int( Y IR n + ) then there exists another equilibrium -denoted by hats -with V (q;M) > V ( q; M).
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Proof. This is an application of familiar results (e.g., Mirrlees 1972 ). The hypotheses guarantee the existence ofq such that V (q; M) > V ( q; M) and x(q; M) 2 Y IR n + , i.e., x(q; M) ŷ for some pointŷ 2 Y . The new equilibrium will haveM = M; hence,x = x(q; M) and V = V (q; M). Aggregate production will be at the pointŷ 2 Y just above. Also, the new head tax will beT = T . The proof will be complete if it is possible to allocate the aggregate productionŷ 2 Y across …rms so that every private sector …rm in the hat equilibrium generates the same after-tax pro…ts as in the bar equilibrium. ThenM h equals income from pro…t shares minus the head tax, as required by part (d) of de…nition 2.1 (equilibrium). From the de…nition of Y , it is indeed possible to allocate production in this way. (Though if f = 0, it may be necessary to takep f = 0: 100 percent taxation of pro…ts.) 3.2 Corollary. Assume x is a continuous function of q, and V is a locally non-satiated function of q. Consider an equilibrium denoted by bars over variables. For this equilibrium, de…ne Y as above. If P f 0 y f 2 int( Y ) then there exists another equilibrium -denoted by hats -with V (q;M) > V ( q; M).
. Now apply theorem 3.1.
For an economy in which Y = Y corollary 3.2 yields full production e¢ ciency. The Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1972) and Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) economies satisfy this condition. Dixit 1987 , Weymark 1979 ) is su¢ cient to guarantee that V is a locally non-satiated function of q. That condition characterizes Pareto improving local changes in consumer prices. 10 The proof of theorem 3.1 made use of the possibility of excess supply -the possibility that condition (c) in de…nition 2.1 (equilibrium) holds with inequality. But even when excess supply is prohibited, as in much of the literature, corollary 3.2 remains true. With P f 0 y f = x( q; M), a minor modi…cation to the proof of theorem 3.1 will prove corollary 3.2 directly. 
Smooth (enough) production frontiers
Corollary 4.5 below proves the claim made by Hahn (1973) , Mirrlees (1972) , and Sadka (1977) regarding the desirability of production e¢ ciency. Speci…cally, if all private sector …rms have smooth production frontiers, then any optimal tax equilibrium must be productively e¢ cient. The …rst two panels of …gure 3 previously illustrated the "increase"-each …rm was able to move its production point northeast to its frontier where it was able to generate positive pro…ts. Roughly, the assumption requires that if a …rm's production frontier has any kinks, they must occur away from the outer edges of Y + f . Thus, the private sector production frontiers do not have to be perfectly smooth, only smooth enough.
The example of production ine¢ ciency on page 107 of Mirrlees (1972) violates assumption 4.1. The essence of that example is illustrated here in …gure 4. Firm 1's constant returns to scale production frontier lies everywhere above …rm 2's kinked production frontier. The kink violates assumption 4.1. Since …rm 2's technology is dominated by …rm 1's, it is productively ine¢ cient for …rm 2 to operate. However, …rm 2 can generate pro…ts while …rm 1 cannot. Assume the economy has a household that needs dividends from these pro…ts to survive. Then a utilitarian government will use taxes to keep …rm 2 in operation with a price ratio that induces the …rm, via pro…t maximization, to operate right at the kink point. Since the …rm is ine¢ cient we want it to be as small as possible, but with positive pro…ts so the household survives. The kink does this for us -it establishes a smallest scale of operations for which pro…ts are positive.
Although the Mirrlees example gives us production ine¢ ciency at the solution to the optimal tax problem, we might consider changes that would restore e¢ ciency. One such change is introduced by Murty (2012) where the instruments for …rm taxation/subsidization may include a lump sum component. In the example of …gure 4, if the government could pay …rm 2 a lump sum subsidy, we would get production e¢ ciency at the optimum -only …rm 1 would operate, while …rm 2 would shut down yet it would still pay dividends from its lump sum subsidy. This may seem bizarre but there are policies that pay farm subsidies "to people who don't farm" (Morgan et al 2006) . While lump sum subsidies may exist in practice, optimal lump sum subsidies are another matter. So we return to the case without them. Mirrlees also considers an alternative to …gure 4 where …rm 2 has a smooth and strictly concave production function (still dominated by …rm 1), which would now satisfy assumption 4.1. In this case, if …rm 2 produces any positive level of output, one could cut the scale of operations in half, say, and still generate positive pro…ts. So no optimal tax equilibrium would exist: each equilibrium could be improved upon by price changes that cut ine¢ cient …rm 2's output in half and increase e¢ cient …rm 1's output correspondingly. The upshot is that the smoothness assumption guarantees any optimal tax equilibrium is productively e¢ cient, but it does not guarantee the existence of an optimum.
If a solution to the optimal tax problem fails to exist, the government would then have to choose tax rates that are almost optimal. The equilibrium would not in general be productively e¢ cient but we might want to know if it is almost productively e¢ cient. Mirrlees states conditions which would apply to this case: "[A]ll producers either operate under constant returns, or obtain positive pro…t for any non-zero production under non-zero prices"
(page 108). In this way, if a …rm is kept in operation solely because its pro…ts are socially desirable, the …rm may be shrunk to an arbitrarily small size (hence, an arbitrarily small ine¢ ciency) while still generating positive pro…ts. These peculiarities arise out of situations where dividend income is an indispensable part of redistribution. Since this is unlikely to be particularly important in practice, we shall move on.
Returning to assumption 4.1, we may …nd that it is di¢ cult to verify in any given situation. However, in the more common case where …rms'production sets are de…ned using continuously di¤erentiable production functions, the assumption will be satis…ed:
This theorem is proved in appendix B. Local non-satiation of G f implies that the boundary of The corollary to the following theorem will give the main production e¢ ciency result. 
Lemma
This lemma is proved in appendix C by adapting Hahn's argument. Observe that the notation K( ) suppresses the dependence of this set on the particular production allocation.
When this notation is used in the proof of theorem 4.3 below, it will refer to the production allocation in the bar equilibrium. 
where the second line follows from assumption 4.1 and the choice of . Again, note that these proofs make use of the weak inequality in part (c) of de…nition 2.1 (equilibrium). Net demand by households can be less than net supply by …rms, with the excess supply purchased by the government and stockpiled. For instance in theorem 4.3, aggregate production in the hat equilibrium will lie in the set K( ) while aggregate consumption will lie in K( ) IR n + . If we change the de…nition and require demand to equal supply in all markets, it is not clear if the same type of proof could be used. But why require equality? We do actually observe government stockpiles of some commodities especially where price supports are in place. Furthermore, if we forbid stockpiles and impose equality we may cause a reduction in welfare. The next section provides a worked example in which a commodity is in excess supply at the optimal tax equilibrium. + also includes the region under the dashed line. There will be excess supply if net demand occurs at x and production at y.
Excess supply
For any optimal tax equilibrium, theorem 4.3 above proved that aggregate net demand must lie on the boundary of Y IR n + . This is essentially the tightest possible result since the actual location of aggregate net demand depends on the data that describe the economy: the number of households, their preferences, their ownership shares, and the social welfare function. 12 In principle, any x 2 @(Y IR n + ) can be supported as an optimum. The possibility of optimal excess supply thus depends on the shape of Y . Speci…cally, it requires the existence of x 2 @(Y IR n + ) and y 2 @Y with x y 6 = x:
(1) Figure 5 provides a crude illustration of this possibility. 13 The …gure indicates that optimal excess supply requires ‡at segments in @(Y IR n + ). This may be quite plausible when there are specialized factors of production (example 5.1 below). Flat segments may also appear when there is uncertainty, as in the technologies considered by Diamond (1967) where one input today yields several (state contingent) outputs tomorrow. 12 The generic size of the set of second best tax equilibria is determined by the number of households (page 237 of Guesnerie 1995). Its position is determined by preferences (which here subsumes endowments) and by ownership shares. The social welfare function determines the selection from this set. 13 Note, this is distinct from Guesnerie's (1977) temporary ine¢ ciencies.
The following example takes a production technology that permits optimal excess supply and constructs the other ingredients to make this indeed optimal. The key feature of the example is that the commodity in excess supply does not satisfy the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) condition. (Hereafter, DM.) 14 That is, some households are net suppliers of this commodity while other households are net demanders. If we were to lower the commodity's consumer price in an e¤ort to stimulate demand and reduce the surplus, the net suppliers would lose utility. Hence, it may be optimal to let the surplus be. This is what drives the example. 15 5.1 Example. There are four commodities: two types of completely specialized labor/leisure (`and n), and two consumption goods (x and z). The economy is static. It would be easier to justify the complete specialization of labor in a dynamic model (e.g., I cannot supply labor services for time periods before I was born), but that would require a more elaborate structure. There are four households and two …rms. There is no head tax. A head tax would
give the government an extra degree of freedom that could be used to control households' incomes. 16 In order to limit the extent of this control it is simpler to eliminate the head tax rather than increase the number of households.
Household 1 (type`laborer) has utility function U 1 (`; x; z) = log`+log x+log z, which is written here as a function of consumption levels, though it could easily be converted into a function of net demand as in section 2. This household is endowed with 3/2 units of leisure. It has no ownership shares in either …rm. The utility maximizing consumption levels satisfy q``= q x x = q z z = q`=2. Since consumption of leisure is 1=2, net demand is 1. The indirect utility function is 2 log q` log q x log q z + constant.
Household 2 (type n laborer) has utility function U 2 (n; x; z) = log n + log x + log z.
It is endowed with 3/2 units of leisure and it has no ownership shares. The utility maximizing consumption levels satisfy q n n = q x x = q z z = q n =2 and the indirect utility function is 2 log q n log q x log q z + constant.
14 The DM condition, stated in theorem 4 on page 23 of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) , is the following: there exists a commodity for which every household is on the same side of the market. So DM is satis…ed if all households are net suppliers of some commodity. It is also satis…ed if all households are net demanders of some commodity. Diamond and Mirrlees show that production e¢ ciency is desirable if DM is satis…ed since this implies local non-satiation of the indirect social welfare function. 15 There are other scenarios, not tied to DM, under which it is undesirable to cut the price and stimulate the demand for the surplus good. In Reinhorn (2007) , a price cut would stimulate demand for complements of the surplus good. This would throw the economy out of general equilibrium, so other prices/taxes would have to be adjusted to restore equilibrium, with negative welfare consequences. 16 If the government has full control over all households' incomes, the outcome will be …rst best. And if preferences are strictly monotone, the …rst best cannot have excess supply. Household 3 (trader) has utility function U 3 (x; z) = log x + log z, and it is endowed with 1 unit of good x. It has no ownership shares and it supplies no labor. The utility maximizing consumption levels satisfy q x x = q z z = q x =2 and the indirect utility function is log q x log q z + constant. Note that household 3 receives the consumer price q x for its net sales of good x, which could di¤er from the producer price p x received by a …rm. We can justify this if p x > q x (a subsidy) since it is not practical to subsidize household to household transactions -it would bankrupt the government.
The example does in fact allow for p x > q x at the optimum.
Household 4 (capitalist) has utility function U 4 (x; z) = log x + log z, and it has no endowment. It owns both …rms, which yields total pro…ts . It supplies no labor to either …rm. The utility maximizing consumption levels satisfy q x x = q z z = =2 and the indirect utility function is 2 log log q x log q z + constant.
The government is not an active producer; Y 0 = f0g.
. This …rm produces good x from type`labor using a strictly increasing, strictly concave, smooth production function F .
For …rm 2, Y 2 = f(L; N; X; Z) j L = 0 ; N 0 ; X = 0 ; Z N=2g. This …rm produces good z from type n labor using a linear technology. It generates zero pro…ts.
The direct social welfare function is W = U 1 + U 2 + 5U 3 + U 4 . The government's problem is to maximize indirect social welfare subject to the weak inequalities for market clearing for each of the four commodities. If the level of production for …rm 1 leads to excess supply, then the market clearing conditions for type`labor and good x will not bind. Then the government's problem is to choose q and to maximize 2 log q`+ 2 log q n + 2 log q x 8 log q z + 2 log subject to q`+ q n + q x + q z :
The constraint incorporates the market clearing condition for good z, the production constraint for …rm 2, and the market clearing condition for type n labor. This problem is homogeneous of degree zero in (q; ), so normalize q z = 1. Then the solution is q`= q n = q x = = 1=4.
At the optimal prices and pro…ts, the supply of type`labor is 1 and the aggregate net demand for good x is 1. To complete the example, choose the production function F for …rm 1 so that F (1) > 1. Since this …rm pays out positive pro…ts at the optimum, it must produce on its e¢ ciency frontier. Thus, there will be excess supply equal to F (1) 1 units in the market for good x, which the government purchases. Alternatively, there could be excess supply in the market for type`labor, which must be paid the wage q`= 1=4 by the government.
We can say the following about optimal producer prices. Firm 2 with its linear technology must face the relative price p z =p n = 2, but p z and p n are not determined individually. If …rm 1 uses one unit of type`labor to produce F (1) > 1 units of good x at the optimum then its …rst order condition is p x F 0 (1) = p`and its pro…t equation is 1=4 = = p x F (1) p`1. So
We can choose the production function so that the producer price p x exceeds the consumer price q x = 1=4 in which case good x is subsidized as was mentioned above in the description of household 3, the trader.
Remark.
The trader plays an integral role in the example. The other three households prefer small values for q x . In fact, as q x # 0 their utilities and their consumption of x explode. Obviously this cannot be consistent with excess supply of x. The trader, on the other hand, prefers large values of q x . This lack of unanimity allows a range of possible outcomes (depending on social welfare weights), including excess supply. This is the essence of the earlier discussion regarding the DM condition.
Observe that the setup for the example satis…es the hypotheses for corollary 4.5. Thus, the example illustrates a relationship between production e¢ ciency and excess supply. If the su¢ cient conditions for production e¢ ciency are satis…ed then the market clearing condition must bind for at least one market. However, it does not have to bind for every market. It may be possible to eliminate excess supply entirely, without reducing social welfare.
In particular, if the government has free disposal (Y 0 IR n + Y 0 ), or if a private …rm with constant returns has free disposal, then any excess supply can simply be thrown out. 17 But there is no real distinction between excess supply and government free disposal. Nor is there 17 Weymark (1981) shows that the aggregate production set is equal to the sum of the boundaries of the …rms'production sets:
Thus, it may seem that the presence or absence of a …rm with free disposal is irrelevant. However, this result does not distinguish between Y + f and @Y f . There may be cases in which it is possible to re-allocate production so that all …rms produce on their boundaries, but in the process one …rm's production vector moves from Y + f to @Y f n Y + f . This could a¤ect pro…ts and dividends, and hence a¤ect net demand and social welfare.
any real distinction between private free disposal and public ownership (since price must be zero). Thus free disposal may e¤ectively re-label, rather than eliminate, excess supply.
Conclusion
Production e¢ ciency continues to be a topic of general interest to economists (e.g., Keen and Wildasin 2004) . In this paper I extend the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production e¢ ciency theorem to economies with pure pro…ts. The result requires that small changes in demand be accommodated by small changes in supply without disrupting the level of dividends paid to households. Previous analyses have had di¢ culty formalizing this continuity assumption. The obstacles are addressed here by taking a new approach to de…ne smoothness of the production frontier. Furthermore, the analysis here allows for the possibility of excess supply, or, in the terminology of Guesnerie (1977) , allows for non-tight equilibria.
Example 5.1 illustrates that excess supply may indeed be optimal. The example is static and deterministic, but the model of section 2 is general enough to include commodities indexed by time and state of nature. These generalizations do not alter the key criterion: If the production set has the necessary shape as described in equation (1) then excess supply may be present at an optimal tax equilibrium.
Recall that the government absorbs the excess supply by purchasing it at market prices.
As mentioned at the end of example 5.1, this can be achieved either by buying up inputs or outputs. Either way, the purchases are not consumed by any household. Rather, they are stockpiled by the government. Although this sounds particularly ine¢ cient, it may be optimal given the constraints faced by the government. So it is natural to ask if we could achieve a better outcome by relaxing those constraints and giving the government more ‡exible policy instruments. The answer is yes if those instruments include unrestricted nonlinear taxation. The idea is to change the shape of the budget set so at least one household can a¤ord more of the stockpiled commodity, while at the same time all other markets continue to clear. This eliminates the surplus but without thwarting social welfare objectives. Appendix D gives a formal statement and proof. Thus the excess supply may be avoided in principle. However, in practice unrestricted nonlinear taxation is not feasible due to the information requirements -the government needs to know the amount of each commodity purchased by each household.
If nonlinear taxation is not the answer perhaps we could introduce …rm speci…c lump sum transfers. This was brie ‡y discussed in section 4. We can also connect it to the …gures 18 in section 1.1. The key issue that led to excess supply in …gure 3 was the desire to get …rms back on their e¢ ciency frontiers so they could pay out the same level of dividends as in the initial equilibrium in …gure 1. If we can achieve this directly with lump sum transfers, there is no need to introduce excess supply. Just give each …rm a transfer that exactly restores the initial dividends. With this instrument the production e¢ ciency theorem can be proved without the need for smooth production frontiers (assumption 4.1) and without the need for excess supply. It might appear that this new instrument is no more di¢ cult to implement than the model's …rm speci…c taxation of pro…ts. As mentioned in section 4, there is a policy that has been implemented and which has lump sum features: paying farmers not to farm.
But this policy is a notorious magnet for abuse and corruption. The same can be expected of any subsidy that is unrelated to the level of production: everyone will try to get a piece which use models similar to the one described in section 2 above.
Part (b) of the proof of Hahn's corollary 3 is not correct. The mapping P (y F ) that takes private production points to supporting price vectors is not continuous as claimed -on the interior of the production set, the only supporting price vector is the zero vector. Under stated assumptions, continuity would be achieved by restricting this mapping to the frontier of the production set. But then the result from part (a) of the proof would not be applicable unless one were willing to assume convexity of the frontier of the production set -which essentially implies a linear technology. Sadka makes the same error.
In Hahn's proposition 4, to demonstrate feasibility of the Pareto superior point, the proof should show that if before-tax pro…ts ( f ) equal zero then after-tax pro…ts (n f ) equal zero.
I.e., a …rm cannot distribute pro…ts that do not exist. However, the proof only seems to require the converse: f > 0 implies n f > 0 (the stated restriction against 100% taxation of pro…ts).
As pointed out by Sadka, Mirrlees's claim on the bottom of page 106 is in error. Mirrlees proceeds to consider a special case on the top of page 108. There are two types of …rms: (i) those that are incapable of generating positive pro…ts (…rms with constant returns) and (ii) those for which Y + f is dense in the boundary of Y f . This is very restrictive since it excludes production sets like Y f = f(y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 ) j y 1 p y 2 ; y 2 0; y 3 0g in which the …rm is not involved in the market for good 3. Clearly this …rm is not of type (i). Nor is it of type (ii) since Y + f excludes all of the boundary points where y 3 = 0 and y 1 < p y 2 (strict inequality).
In practice, most …rms participate in relatively few markets so it would be desirable to go beyond the special case considered by Mirrlees. Corollary 4.5 above does this.
Consider now the paper by Dasgupta and Stiglitz. There is one key assumption: pro…ts are always strictly positive. Formally, each …rm is characterized by a di¤erentiable function that maps a normalized price vector p to a net supply vector. The assumption is that the inner product of these two vectors is strictly positive. This is similar to Mirrlees's special case. Despite the limitations from using calculus methods, the argument in Dasgupta and Stiglitz can be made rigorous. This follows from corollary 3.2 above.
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Appendix B Proof of theorem 4.2
For ease of notation, omit the …rm subscript f . Let rG denote the gradient of G. In order to prove the theorem, the following two lemmas will be helpful. The theorem's hypotheses also apply to these lemmas.
Lemma B.1 shows that rG can serve as a supporting price vector. A proof is given on page 780 of Arrow and Enthoven (1961) . Lemma B.2 below characterizes all supporting price vectors at points where rG 6 = 0.
Proof. By hypothesis, ( y o ; y i ) is a solution to the following constrained optimization problem:
The Lagrangian for this problem is
That is, the only Lagrange multipliers ( ;
(Recall that rG( y o ; y i ) 6 = 0.) Therefore, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions must be satis…ed, and these conditions correspond to the conclusion of the lemma.
To prove the theorem, let ( y o ; y i ) 2 Y + . The task is to …nd > 0 that satis…es the condition in assumption 4.1. By de…nition of Y + , lemma B.2 yields rG( y o ; y i ) ( y o ; y i ) > 0.
Since rG 0, this implies that for some output j, y Thus if is close to 1 then x 2 K( ) IR n + , and hence from (2), a x a x . Since 1 > 0, the de…nition of x and some simple algebra yields a x a x. This is true for any x 2 Y IR n + . Since a 6 = 0, it follows thatx is a boundary point of Y IR n + .
Appendix D Nonlinear taxation
Nonlinear taxation was discussed brie ‡y in the conclusion. To formalize this, replace the linear budget constraint q x h P f hf f T with the more general constraint Q(x h ) P f hf f where the function Q is a policy choice for the government.
D.1 Theorem. Consider an equilibrium in which there is excess supply of commodity j. Assume the following: (i) all households exhaust their budgets and one of the households has strictly greater income than all the others; (ii) the richest household's utility is strictly increasing in commodity j; (iii) social welfare is strictly increasing in the utility of the richest household. Then there exists another equilibrium with strictly greater social welfare.
Proof. Let bars over variables denote the original equilibrium and let z j be the amount of excess supply. Suppose household 1 has the strictly largest income in the bar equilibrium.
Let hats over variables denote the welfare superior equilibrium. In this new equilibrium, production and pro…ts remain as before. The new pricing functionQ will coincide with Q except at one point:Q( x 1 + z j e j ) = Q( x 1 ) where e j is the unit vector along the jth axis. By monotonicity of preferences, household 1 will now choosex 1 = x 1 + z j e j . All other households will leave their demand unchanged since the new price for x 1 + z j e j is not a¤ordable. By de…nition of z j these demands are feasible, and by the monotonicity assumptions social welfare has risen.
